You\u27re in the Army Now!  Reforming Military Enlistment Contracts by Steck, Jason
Hamline Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 3
2015




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Hamline. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hamline Law Review by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Hamline. For more information, please contact jneilson01@hamline.edu.
Recommended Citation





YOU’RE IN THE ARMY NOW! REFORMING MILITARY 
ENLISTMENT CONTRACTS 
Jason Steck* 
I. ENLISTMENT AS CONTRACT 452 
A. ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ENLISTMENT CONTRACT 452 
1. UNITED STATES V. GRIMLEY 453 
B. MILITARY ENLISTMENT CONTRACTS IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER 
FORCE (AVF) ERA 455 
II. EXCEPTIONS TO ENLISTMENT AS CONTRACT 457 
A. AMBIGUITY NOT CONSTRUED AGAINST DRAFTER 457 
B. IMPLICIT WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 460 
III. TOWARD A MORE FAIR MILITARY ENLISTMENT 
CONTRACT 463 
IV. CONCLUSION 465 
 
“We’re here to protect democracy, not practice it.”1 
 
Late on Christmas Eve, a father hears a racket on his roof, rushes to 
investigate, and yells at a potential intruder. 2 The intruder falls from the roof, 
disappearing, but leaves his distinctive red and white clothing behind.3 
Following the instructions on a card found within what he realizes was 
Santa’s clothing, the father dons the suit, completes the Christmas deliveries, 
and returns Santa’s sleigh to the North Pole.4 Only then is he shown the tiny 
inscription on the card mandating that whoever accepts Santa’s suit becomes 
Santa Claus. 5 Hilarity ensues. The film The Santa Clause is a beloved 
Christmas comedy but, aside from the merits of Tim Allen’s acting 
performance, why is it beloved? The answer lies in a long filmmaking 
tradition featuring characters caught by terms of agreements they did not 
fully understand in advance.6 
                                                 
* Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater County, Minnesota. The author would like 
to thank Kelsey Kelley, Judge John P. Smith, Veronica Mason, and the board and staff of the 
Hamline Law Review for their support and assistance in developing this article. 
1 CRIMSON TIDE (Hollywood Pictures 1995). 




6 See, e.g., THE DEVIL AND DANIEL WEBSTER (RKO Pictures 1941) (a man sells 
his soul to the Devil and Satan comes to collect); IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 
1947) (a man wishes he was never born and is shown the results of his wish); THE LITTLE 
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The problem is far more than fodder for filmmakers, of course. The 
failure of contracting parties to comprehend the full extent of their 
obligations produces a steady stream of disputes both in and out of 
courtrooms.7 Although there is lavish case law addressing problems arising 
when contracting parties fail to understand the consequences of business 
contracts, there is another type of contract affecting hundreds of thousands of 
persons every year that has received virtually no attention: military 
enlistment.8 
This article intends to fill that gap. Part One will survey the 
evolution of military enlistment contracts.9 Part Two will discuss two areas 
of standard contract law—the requirement that waivers of rights be made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and the principle that adhesion 
contracts are construed against the drafter—and show how the courts have 
refused to apply them to military enlistment contracts.10 Part Three will 
sketch a plan to reform future military enlistment contracts by providing 
important information to enlistees regarding the consequences of their 
contracted change of status.11 
I.  ENLISTMENT AS CONTRACT 
A.  Origins of the American Military Enlistment Contract 
American notions of military service have always been rooted in a 
direct relationship between the individual soldier and the state.12 All citizens 
owed the State a duty of service, and the terms of that service were at the 
sole discretion of the State.13 The use of voluntary enlistment through 
contract was thus a matter of convenience, not a matter of right.14 Whenever 
the supply of volunteers should prove inadequate, the government retained 
the right to compel service on whatever terms it might dictate.15 
                                                                                                                   
MERMAID (Walt Disney Pictures 1989) (an infatuated mermaid trades her voice to become 
human); THE HUNGER GAMES (Lionsgate 2012) (a young girl volunteers to replace her sister 
in gladiatorial games and is sucked into a political maelstrom as well). 
7 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (Foundation 2001). 
8 See Who is Volunteering for Today’s Military?, http://www.defense.gov/news
/Dec2005/d20051213mythfact.pdf (accessed Apr. 12, 2015) (stating that 180,000 people enlist 
in the military every year). 
9 Infra Part I. 
10 Infra Part II. 
11 Infra Part III. 
12 Captain David A. Schlueter, The Enlistment Contract: A Uniform Approach, 77 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1977) (tracing the emergence of the American system of military 
enlistment from its origins in feudal Europe). 
13 United States v. Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt) 405, 408–09 (1847). 
14 See id. at 409 (noting that the government “ought, in its discretion, to select, in 
the first place, for such service, those who are desirous of rendering it”). 
15 See Schlueter, supra note 12, at 4–5. 
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Even in the early history of the United States, Congress tended to 
prefer voluntary enlistment to compelled service through conscription.16 But 
“the contract of enlistment is peculiar in that it is a contract made with the 
State, under the specific authority of the Constitution, and thus governed by 
those principles or considerations of expediency and economy, expressed in 
the term ‘public policy.’”17 Congress therefore determined who was eligible 
to enter into an enlistment contract, including such factors as “nationality, 
race, age, [and] physical and moral qualifications.”18 Congress also retained 
the inherent authority to unilaterally modify the terms of an enlistment 
contract, even retroactively.19 In short, the State’s choice to use the 
contractual form did not reduce the state’s power to compel military service, 
nor did it require that the state comply with common-law limits—such as the 
principle that contracts entered into by minors are voidable—that would 
interfere with its sovereign powers.20 
1.  United States v. Grimley 
The Supreme Court defined the nature of the 19th-century enlistment 
contract in United States v. Grimley.21 40-year-old John Gimley enlisted in 
the army, claiming to be 28 years old.22 Congress had, at the time, set 35 
years as the maximum age for an eligible enlistee.23 After Gimley deserted 
from the army, he was tried by court-martial and found guilty.24 A federal 
district court granted Gimley’s request for a writ of habeas corpus, ruling that 
Gimley’s enlistment was void because of his age and that the army therefore 
lacked the jurisdiction to court-martial him.25 
After the court of appeals affirmed the district court, the Supreme 
Court reversed.26 The Court highlighted the unusual contractual nature of 
military enlistment stating, “[e]nlistment is a contract, but it is one of those 
contracts which changes the status, and where that is changed, no breach of 
the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its 
existence imposes.”27 The Court compared enlistment to marriage and 
naturalization, emphasizing that in both cases the misconduct of a party in 
                                                 
16 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 539–40 (2d ed. 1920) 
(describing congressional efforts to incentivize enlistment) 
17 Id. at 538. 
18 Id. at 540. 
19 See id. at 539 (stating that an enlistment contract “is entered into with the 
understanding that it may be modified in any of its terms, or wholly rescinded, at the 
discretion of the State”). 
20 Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) at 414–15. 
21 United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). 
22 Id. at 150. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 149–50. 
25 Id. at 150. 
26 Id. at 150, 157. 
27 Grimley, 137 U.S. at 151. 
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entering into the contract cannot relieve him from the obligations he 
undertook in the contract.28 The comparison to marriage drew on the 
longstanding view that marriage is a contractual relationship, entered into by 
parties that have the capacity to “understand[] the meaning, rights, and 
obligations of marriage.”29 Accordingly, the Court held that Grimley could 
not by his own misconduct be relieved from the consequences of an 
otherwise valid enlistment,30 concluding that “[t]he government, and the 
government alone, is the party to the transaction that can raise objections on 
that ground.”31 
The Grimley Court also gave some insight into the procedural 
requirements for a valid 19th-century enlistment.32 Grimley argued, in part, 
that his enlistment was procedurally invalid because the recruiting officer 
had failed to read to him the Articles of War, as required by statute and army 
regulations.33 Congress had mandated that the “rules and articles” governing 
an enlistee’s behavior “shall be read to every enlisted man at the time of, or 
within six days after, his enlistment.”34 An Army regulation was more 
stringent, requiring that two articles be read to an enlistee prior to his taking 
the oath of enlistment, “after which he will be allowed time to consider the 
subject until his mind appears to be fully made up before the oath is 
administered to him.”35 Because the Court found, as a factual matter, that the 
requirements had been met,36 it did not address whether an enlistment was 
voidable for failure to comply with this notice requirement.37 But the 
requirement that enlistees be read the articles of war nonetheless indicated a 
congressional intent to ensure that enlistees had some idea of what joining 
the military really meant.38 
                                                 
28 Id. at 152. 
29 In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. App. 2014); see, 
e.g., In re Kincaid’s Estate, 57 N.W.2d 628, 633–34 (Minn. 1953) (quoting statute establishing 
requirements for marriage contract). 
30 Grimley, 137 U.S. at 150. 
31 Id. at 150, 154. 
32 See id. at 154 (describing Grimley’s enlistment process) 
33 Id. at 155–56. 
34 Grimley, 137 U.S. at 155–56. 
35 Id. at 156. 
36 Id. 
37 Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 156 (1890). But see WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 546 
(noting that enlistments that fail to comply with Army regulations were not voidable “against 
the consent of the government” because only Congress’ requirements are binding upon the 
government). 
38 Grimley, 137 U.S. at 156–57 (holding that “the taking of the oath of allegiance 
is the pivotal fact which changes the status from that of civilian to that of soldier”) (emphasis 
in original). 
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B.  Military Enlistment Contracts in the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) Era 
The abolition of the draft and the transition to an all-volunteer 
military provoked a debate over the contractual cast of military enlistment. 
Drawing on the language in Grimley, contract-law theorists analyzed the 
enlistment contract “as a true contract, governed by traditional contract 
law.”39 This approach assessed the enlistment agreement itself as but one 
among several components of the enlistment contract, and it argued that 
statutes and regulations were incorporated into the enlistment contract by 
reference.40 It assessed the sufficiency of enlistment according to traditional 
notions of contract law, including offer and acceptance, consideration, 
capacity of the parties to contract, and the strictures of public-policy 
considerations.41 
Others replied, however, that Grimley’s use of enlistment-as-contract 
language was misleading, and that “the application of contract principles to 
enlistment often results in injustice to enlistees and the contravention of the 
policies of the government.”42 This approach argued that military enlistments 
were governed by statutes, making a contract-law approach inappropriate.43 
Further, the remedies for problems such as fraudulent enlistments procured 
by recruiters’ misrepresentations, “could [be] advanced regardless of whether 
enlistment is viewed as a contract.”44 Rather than viewing enlistment as the 
formation of a contract, then, this approach argues that enlistment should 
“best be viewed . . . as an administrative procedure that results in a restriction 
of liberty and the loss of certain constitutional rights.”45 
The courts firmly resolved this debate in favor of treating enlistment 
in the all-volunteer era as a contract.46 Courts have continued to note the 
change in status effected by an enlistment contract, but have cautioned that 
“change of status does not invalidate the contractual obligation of either 
party or prevent the contract from being upheld . . . .”47 In particular, one 
court noted, “recruiting activities . . . by their very nature, involve a crucial 
intersection of the military and the general public that cannot be left to the 
sole discretion of the military.”48 Thus, the determination of whether a valid 
enlistment contract is formed and the enforcement of the terms of that 
                                                 
39 Neil J. Dilloff, A Contractual Analysis of the Military Enlistment, 8 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 121, 121–22, 148 (1974). 
40 Id. at 126–27. 
41 Id. at 127–36. 
42 William P. Casella, Armed Forces Enlistment: The Use and Abuse of Contract, 
39 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 783–84, 784–87 (1972). 
43 Id. at 789. 
44 Id. at 794. 
45 Id. at 813. 
46 See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 402 (1961) (citing Grimley to 
support the statement that “[e]nlistment is a contract”). 
47 Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D. Colo. 1968) (emphasis added). 
48 Brown v. Dunleavy, 722 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
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contract “fall[] within the expertise of the judiciary” and “are decided under 
traditional theories of contract law.”49 
In adapting the contractual theory of enlistment for the AVF era, 
courts have limited the ability of the government to unilaterally modify the 
terms of the enlistment contract, holding, for example, that “[t]he integrity of 
the recruiting process in today’s all volunteer peacetime Navy compels 
rescission” when recruiters’ misrepresentations made it impossible for the 
prospective recruit to fully evaluate the costs and benefits of enlistment.50 
Courts have accordingly upheld challenges to the validity of enlistment 
contracts due to recruiters’ misrepresentations about the potential recruit’s 
eligibility for particular duty, the military’s failure to provide a promised 
training program, the military’s failure to provide promised incentive pay, 
and the military’s involuntary extension of an enlistment period in the 
absence of statutory authority. 51 
Apart from situations involving recruiters’ willful 
misrepresentations, however, the reach of courts’ application of contract-law 
principles to military enlistment contracts has continued to be somewhat 
limited. The Supreme Court held in Bell v. United States that military pay 
was governed by statute, not contract principles.52 Thus, although common-
law contract principles would bar the government from unilaterally altering 
the terms of a contract, the government may nonetheless change the formula 
used to calculate the amounts paid under, for example, a reenlistment-
incentive-bonus program, to the extent that such ad hoc changes serve 
legislative purposes.53 
Courts have also refused to grant rescission of enlistment contracts 
for the government’s violation of terms that the courts deem nonessential to 
the fundamental purpose of the enlistment contract. For example, in Crane v. 
Coleman, a federal district court declined to rescind an enlistment contract 
after the government failed to timely pay a promised enlistment incentive 
and failed to grant the enlistee a promised period of leave, ruling that these 
failures were “not so material and substantial as to defeat the purpose of the 
enlistment contract and the object of the parties.”54 Thus, courts have often 
been deferential to the government in construing the government’s 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1353. 
51 Id. at 1354 (allowing testimony regarding promises made that recruit would be 
enrolled in chosen training program in spite of his ineligibility); Withum v. O’Connor, 506 F. 
Supp. 1374, 1378 (D. Puerto Rico 1984) (military failed to honor promises to provide 
particular training and facilitated enlistee’s college education); Frantheway v. Bodenhamer, 
444 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Wyo. 1977) (rescinding enlistment contract due to military’s failure 
to provide promised incentive payment); Taylor v. United States, 711 F.2d 1199, 1203 (3d. 
Cir. 1983) (holding that military’s extension of member’s enlistment lacked statutory 
authority). 
52 Bell, 366 U.S. 393, 401–02 (1961). 
53 United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 871–72 (1977). 
54 Crane v. Coleman, 389 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
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substantive burdens under the enlistment contract. Nevertheless, the courts 
have consistently reaffirmed the overarching rule that enlistment contracts 
are governed by contract law, leading at least one scholar to conclude that, 
when addressing challenges to enlistment agreements, “[a]ll courts have 
ruled according to contract law, where applicable.”55 
II.  EXCEPTIONS TO ENLISTMENT AS CONTRACT 
The sweeping claim—that courts treat military enlistments as 
contracts—turns out in practice to be riddled with exceptions. One such 
exception is that military enlistment contracts differ from other types of 
personal-services contracts in that courts remedy breaches of the enlistment 
contract by ordering specific performance.56 This section will focus on two 
additional areas where courts recite the mantra that military enlistments are 
contracts, but depart from contract-law principles in practice.57 Specifically, 
when addressing challenges to the validity of provisions in military 
enlistment contracts, courts have not applied the contract-law principle that 
ambiguity is construed against the drafter nor have they required that 
constitutional rights be waived explicitly.58 
A.  Ambiguity Not Construed Against Drafter 
A basic rule of contract interpretation requires that, when a contract 
term is ambiguous in its meaning or effect, the courts will resolve the 
ambiguity in a manner that favors the party that did not draft the ambiguous 
term.59 This rule is often referenced using the Latin term contra proferentem, 
meaning literally “against the offeror.” 60 “The reason for this rule is to 
protect the party who did not choose the language from an unintended or 
unfair result.”61 Because its purpose is to protect a contracting party from the 
unpredictable effects of ambiguous language chosen by a drafting party, the 
rule is applied more vigorously in adhesion contracts.62 Insurance contracts 
                                                 
55 Major Udi Sagi, Specific Performance of Enlistment Contracts, 205 MIL. L. 
REV. 150, 166 (2010). 
56 See id.at 170–89 (arguing that the application of the specific-performance 
remedy to enlistment contracts is justified because none of the policy concerns underlying the 
rule against that remedy for personal-services contracts apply to military enlistments); see also 
Dilloff, supra note 39, at 147 (noting that the “general rule” against ordering specific 
performance as remedy for breach of employment contracts “is apparently not applicable to 
enlistment contracts, since the courts have, in effect, ordered specific performance . . .”). 
57 See infra Part II.A–B. 
58 See infra Part II.A–B. 
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). 
60 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (9th ed. 2009); see e.g., Mesa Air Grp. v. Dep’t 
of Transp., 87 F.3d 498, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
61 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). 
62 David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form 
Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 457-58 (2009). 
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are common examples of adhesion contracts because they are drafted by 
insurance companies and presented to clients without meaningful 
opportunity to negotiate over specific terms.63 Accordingly, when the terms 
of an insurance contract are ambiguous, the rule requires that courts resolve 
the ambiguity in favor of the insured party.64 For example, when an 
insurance contract required that the insured party provide a value estimate of 
the insured property and his estimate turned out to be unintentionally 
inflated, the Court ruled that the insurance company could not avoid paying 
the insured’s claim because the contract language was ambiguous as to the 
consequences of an unintentionally erroneous estimate.65 
When employment contracts involve nonprofessional occupations 
and a strong disparity of power between employer and employee, 
employment contracts are adhesion contracts.66 A prospective employer sets 
the terms of employment and offers these to the prospective employee on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.67 Military enlistment contracts certainly fit the bill.68 
Enlistment contracts are drafted by the government and set forth in a 
standardized form.69 Their terms are set by law and policy and are not subject 
to individualized negotiation or variation.70 Prospective enlistees are told that 
their acceptance into military employment is subject to their ability and 
willingness to meet the conditions set by the government; the government 
does not promise to meet any conditions set by the enlistee.71 In every 
conceivable way, the terms of enlistment are controlled and monitored by the 
government, not the enlistee. 
                                                 
63 Id. at 443–44 (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 236, cmt. d 
(1932)). 
64 Id. at 441–42. But see also id. at 451–57 (chronicling a decline in courts’ use of 
the doctrine). 
65 First Nat’l Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U.S. 673, 673–76 (1877). 
66 See Allison E. McClure, Note, The Professional Presumption: Do Professional 
Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter Into Employment-Related 
Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1506–07 (2006) (“[I]nequality is inherent in 
the [nonprofessional] employment relationship because the employer generally controls the 
terms of the contract . . . .”). 
67 See, e.g., Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250, 265 (Mont. 
2003) (holding that teacher’s employment contract was adhesion contract where teachers were 
not unionized and where there were 80 other applicants for the teaching position). 
68 See Casella, supra note 42, at 795–96 (arguing that it is wrong to treat 
enlistment agreements as contracts because doing so requires enforcing adhesion contracts). 
69 See DD Form 4/1, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, ARMED FORCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/forms
/eforms/dd0004.pdf. 
70 See id. at ¶¶ 9 (noting that Congress may change the terms of the enlistment 
contract at any time), 8.c (disclaiming all promises that depart from the standardized terms of 
the enlistment contract). But see also Gengler v. Dep’t of Defense & Navy, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1238 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that enlistment contract that conflicts with statute was not 
necessarily unenforceable because statute does not specifically preclude enforcement of 
conflicting contracts). 
71 See id. at ¶ 9.a(2) (informing enlistees that they may be discharged for failure 
to meet military standards). 
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The enlistment contract language is not only unalterable, it is also 
extremely vague regarding important matters. For example, the current 
enlistment contract requires prospective enlistees to acknowledge that “many 
laws, regulations, and military customs will govern [their] conduct.”72 The 
contract further provides that enlistees must “obey all lawful orders and 
perform all assigned duties,” but fails to explain how to differentiate 
“lawful” orders from unlawful ones or cite any of the military laws and 
regulations relevant to that determination.73 The contract states that enlistees 
will be “[s]ubject to the military justice system,” but does not cite to any 
statutes or documents that define that system.74 In fact, although the 
enlistment agreement cites provisions that relate to variations on the enlistees 
length of service, it includes no citations to specific statutes, regulations, or 
rules relating to military laws, procedures, or conduct rules.75 
Although the terms of the conduct section of the enlistment contract 
are vague and general, the effects of its provisions are massive. Once 
enlisted, military members are subject to an entirely different criminal justice 
system governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 
Manual for Courts Martial (MCM).76 In addition to defining well-known 
prosecutable crimes such as theft, sexual assault, and murder, the UCMJ and 
MCM define several crimes that are unique to the military, including 
insubordination, absence without leave, and desertion.77 The UCMJ also 
includes “general articles” that broadly regulate conduct that is 
“unbecoming” and that can potentially impose the only criminal liability for 
purely political speech in American law.78 Military members are also subject 
to voluminous regulations governing the groups they may associate with, 
monitoring their management of their financial affairs, and controlling the 
tiniest details of personal dress, accessorizing, and grooming.79 Although it 
may be commonly assumed that military members know exactly what they 
                                                 
72 DD Form 4/1, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, supra note 69, at ¶ 9.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at ¶ 10. See id. at ¶ 9. 
76 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]; MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL (2012) [hereinafter MCM], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military
_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf. 
77 UCMJ §§ 885, 886, 891; MCM pt. IV, §§ 9, 10, 15. 
78 See UCMJ §§ 933, 934; MCM pt. IV, §§ 59, 72. 
79 See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 (2009; Supp. 2014) 
(prohibiting membership in racist groups), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/direc
tives/corres/pdf/132506p.pdf ; Air Force Instruction 36-2906 (2013) (regulating member’s 
financial responsibility), available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af
_a1/publication/afi36-2906/afi36-2906.pdf; Air Force Instruction 36-2903 (2011; Supp. 2014) 
(governing hair length and clothing and accessories worn), available at http://www.
afpc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140814-096.pdf; see also Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. 
Supp. 206, 211 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (“Generally speaking, people have the right to wear their 
hair as they wish, and this right is protected by the due process clause. However, this is a 
‘civilian’ right and full time soldiers may not be entitled to assert it.”) (citations omitted). 
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are getting into, the basis for this assumption is unclear; military enlistment 
contracts provide no specific notice of the unique legal and regulatory system 
to which military members acquiesce by signing the enlistment contract.80 
In spite of military enlistment contracts’ status as adhesive 
employment contracts often entered into by very young adults with little or 
no sophistication in legal matters, and the vagueness of the contract 
language, courts have generally not applied contra proferentum when 
addressing challenges to the validity or meaning of the enlistment contract.81 
In non-military contexts, courts might be skeptical of whether contracts 
signed under such conditions reflected genuine consent.82 But when 
reviewing challenges raised by enlistees, courts typically assume that 
military members somehow know exactly what they are getting into by 
enlisting.83 Even when recruiters have failed to comply with statutes 
requiring that potential recruits be made aware of some details of the laws to 
which they will be subject, courts have found that the enlistee had sufficient 
knowledge of the obligations he accepted by enlisting.84 There are few, if 
any, cases where courts have applied contra proferentum to interpret 
enlistment contract language in favor of the enlistee. 
B. Implicit Waivers of Constitutional Rights 
Another important area where courts routinely depart from the usual 
requirements of contract law is in the area of waivers of constitutional rights. 
Military enlistment results in waiver or modification of several constitutional 
rights,85 including free-speech and free-association rights,86 the right to free 
exercise of religion,87 and the right to trial by jury.88 
                                                 
80 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
81 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 2012 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMUNITY 39 (2012) (noting that nearly 80% of military recruits have not yet received a 
bachelor’s degree), available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2012. 
82 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965). In Walker-Thomas, Justice Skelly Wright observed, “when a party of little 
bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract 
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an 
objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.” 
83 See, e.g., McCord v. Page, 124 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1941) (stating that the 
military member “was fully aware of the duties and responsibilities he . . . assumed” by 
enlisting). 
84 Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 156 (1890). 
85 See Krill v. Bauer, 314 F. Supp. 965, 966–67 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (“Does being in 
the Army curtail or suspend certain Constitutional rights?, the answer is unqualifiedly ‘yes’. 
Of necessity, he is forced to surrender many important rights. He arises unwillingly at an 
unreasonable hour at the sound of a bugle unreasonably loud. From that moment on, his 
freedom of choice and will ceases to exist. He acts at the command of some person—not a 
representative of his own choice—who gives commands to him which he does not like to 
obey. He is assigned to a squad and forced to associate with companions not of his selection 
and frequently the chores which he may be ordered to perform are of a most menial nature.”). 
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It is well-established that individuals may waive constitutional rights 
by contract.89 This is routinely done in the process of plea-bargaining in 
criminal cases.90 Plea bargains are contracts, and courts will generally 
interpret and enforce their provisions in accordance with the principles of 
contract law.91 When determining if a criminal defendant has, through a plea 
bargain, validly waived his right to a jury trial, courts assess whether the 
waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.92 Waivers of constitutional 
rights in criminal cases must be explicit.93 At a minimum, defendants must 
be specifically told that they are waiving their rights to have their guilt 
determined by unanimous vote of a 12-member jury and to participate in the 
selection of jurors.94 “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, 
intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the 
nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the 
circumstances.”95 Thus, a valid waiver of constitutional rights in a criminal 
context requires at a minimum that the government specifically identify and 
explain the nature of the right being waived. 
Similar requirements limit contractual waivers of rights in the 
commercial context. Like the waiver of constitutional rights in plea-bargain 
                                                                                                                   
86 Compare U.S. Const., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .), with MCM pt. 
IV, § 72 (prohibiting “disloyal statements”) and Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 
(2009; Supp. 2014) (prohibiting membership in racist groups); see also Jason Steck, Note, 
Dissent Without Disloyalty: Expanding the Free Speech Rights of Military Members Under 
the “General Articles” of the UCMJ, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1606, 1611–13 (2012) (describing 
limits on military members’ free-speech rights). 
87 Compare U.S. Const., amend. I (prohibiting restrictions on the free exercise of 
religion), with Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense, 553 F. Supp. 719, 721–22 (D.C. 1982) 
(upholding Air Force regulation barring wearing of religious headgear while in uniform) and 
McCord, 124 F.2d at 69 (noting that the requirement that a military member salute the flag 
violated the religious teachings of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society). 
88 Compare Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (holding that 
unanimous jury verdicts support findings of guilt in federal criminal trials), with MCM pt. II, 
Rule 921(c) (allowing guilt to be found based on a 2/3 vote of the court-martial panel in cases 
not involving mandatory application of the death penalty). 
89 See, e.g., Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke, 149 F.3d 277, 
280 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[S]imply because a contract includes the waiver of a constitutional right 
does not render the contract per se unenforceable.”). 
90 See generally Derek Teeter, Note, A Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right 
to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727 (2005) (analyzing waivers of appeal 
rights in plea bargains). 
91 See, e.g., United States v. Puckett, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (analyzing breach 
of plea agreement as breach of contract). 
92 See e.g., United States v. Carmenate, 544 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting 
that courts require that waivers of rights in plea agreements be knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent). 
93 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[C]ourts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
94 Marone v. United States, 10 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993). 
95 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (emphasis in original). 
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contracts, courts have required that waiver of constitutional rights in 
commercial contracts be knowing and voluntary.96 For a waiver to be valid, it 
must be expressly stated in the contract itself.97 Waivers in adhesion 
contracts are particularly suspect because they may lack indicators that the 
waived rights were adequately explained to the less-powerful party.98 For 
example, in Gonzalez v. Hidalgo County, the court held that determining the 
validity of a jury-trial waiver provision in a lease between a landowner and a 
migrant worker required additional inquiry to establish whether it had been 
adequately explained to the migrant worker.99 
Near the beginnings of the AVF, there were signs that the courts 
might apply these standards to military enlistment contracts. In Wallace v. 
Chafee, the Ninth Circuit held that a military reservist was subject to the 
UCMJ because his enlistment contract explicitly referenced the code.100 The 
court relied on the fact that the reservist’s contract had referenced the UCMJ, 
putting him on notice that he would be subject to the military’s 
jurisdiction.101 The court found that, by accepting enlistment after being 
notified that he would be subject to the UCMJ, the reservist voluntarily 
waived his rights to reject the UCMJ’s restrictions.102 The court further held 
that the execution of the enlistment contract was a key turning point, after 
which the enlistee could no longer reject the application of the UCMJ, even 
if it was later found that the reservist had not fully understood the 
implications.103 
Similarly, in Garmon v. Warner, a federal district court enjoined 
enforcement of a military policy barring reservists from wearing wigs to 
temporarily comply with grooming and appearance requirements because 
“the hair regulation does not mention wigs” and where “[t]here was no 
knowing and voluntary relinquishment of an understood right, the requisites 
of a waiver do not exist.”104 
These holdings would seem to place military enlistment contracts on 
the same footing as other contracts, requiring specific notice to enlistees in 
                                                 
96 E.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985); Lake 
James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 149 F.3d at 280. 
97 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972). 
98 See id.; cf. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186–87 (1972) (holding 
that jury-trial waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made where it was clearly stated in 
contract and parties were both sophisticated); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 149 
F.3d at 281 (holding that fire department’s waiver of its rights was valid in spite of its “weak 
bargaining position” because the waiver was knowing and voluntary). 
99 Gonzalez v. Hidalgo County,489 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1973). 
100 Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1971). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1378. 
103 Id. 
104 Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206, 211–12 (W.D.N.C. 1973). Contra Talley 
v. McLucas, 366 F. Supp. 1241, 1243–44 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (refusing to review Army’s hair 
regulations out of deference to military’s “demands of discipline and duty, and possibly to 
health and safety” (quotation omitted)). 
12
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/3
2015] YOU'RE IN THE ARMY NOW! 463 
 
the contract that they are subject to the UCMJ. But in the more than 40 years 
since Wallace, the language in the enlistment contract specifying that 
enlistees are subject to the UCMJ has been removed.105 Even the pre-AVF 
notice provisions mentioned in Grimley seem to be absent in the current 
enlistment contract.106 In spite of these omissions, no opinion from any court 
has cited Wallace’s implicit requirement that enlistees be notified that they 
are subject to the UCMJ. Although courts have required that enlistments be 
voluntary, no court has invalidated an enlistment contract for its failure to 
obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of the enlistee’s rights.107 To the 
contrary, courts have applied the remarkable rule that “statutes and military 
regulations in effect when the [enlistment] agreement was made are 
incorporated into every enlistment agreement,”108 without reference to the 
contract-law requirement that incorporated documents be referenced 
explicitly.109 The courts’ repetition of the rule that military enlistment is a 
contract thus is exposed as a rather thin veneer, concealing a reality that does 
not differ much from the earliest status-change theories, where contract-law 
requirements could be ignored at the whim of the sovereign.110 
III.  TOWARD A MORE FAIR MILITARY ENLISTMENT 
CONTRACT 
The courts’ continuing reluctance to hold the government to normal 
rules of contract interpretation and enforcement is not necessarily a barrier to 
reform. This section will outline changes that should be made to future 
military enlistment contracts to better inform military members of the rights 
waived or restricted by military enlistment. 
In contrast to the vagueness that pervades the conduct section of the 
enlistment contract, the section relating to extensions on terms of enlistment 
                                                 
105 See DD Form 4/1, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, supra note 69, at ¶ 9. 
106 Compare 137 U.S. at 156–57 (noting the statutory requirement that certain 
Articles of War be read to enlistees near the time of their enlistment), with DD Form 4/1, 
Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, supra note 69, at ¶ 9. 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Catlow, 458 C.M.R. 758, 761–62 (C.M.A. 1974) 
(invalidating enlistment where enlistee was coerced by threat of incarceration); United States 
v. Fry, 70 M.J. 465, 475 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (recognizing a statutory requirement that those who 
voluntarily accept military pay and allowances can be deemed to have constructively enlisted 
notwithstanding defects in execution of enlistment contract). 
108 Canonica v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 516, 521 (1998). 
109 See, e.g., Northrup Grumman Information Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 
F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (“[T]he language used in a contract to incorporate extrinsic 
material by reference must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the written material being 
incorporated and must clearly communicate that the purpose of the reference is 
to incorporate the referenced material into the contract.”); see also Casella, supra note 42, at 
796 (noting that language in enlistment contracts fails to “fill the gap” between enlistees’ 
knowledge and the realities of military service). 
110 See supra, notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
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includes several specific citations to authorizing statutes.111 Although these 
provisions are not exhaustive and may be altered by subsequent statutory 
changes, courts have found them sufficient to put enlistees on notice that 
their term of enlistment may be extended when relevant statutory conditions 
are met.112 One way to correct the ambiguity in the conduct section of the 
enlistment contract would therefore be to include specific citations to the 
statutes codifying the UCMJ, thereby notifying potential enlistees of 
specifically where they might find the foundational rules for military 
members. 113 To serve particularly diligent or inquisitive enlistees’ efforts to 
fully comprehend the consequences of the enlistment contract, the conduct 
section of the contract could also reference the MCM, and recruiters’ offices 
could be required to maintain copies of the UCMJ and the MCM for 
potential enlistees’ reference. By explicitly incorporating these documents by 
reference into the enlistment contract, enlistees would be more fairly put on 
notice, much ambiguity would be removed from the contract, and the legal 
foundation for enforcing the UCMJ and MCM as parts of the enlistment 
contract would be made much more sound without need to resort to obsolete 
notions of a sovereign’s right to arbitrarily impose the terms of military 
service.114 As at least one of the advocates of a contract-law approach to 
military enlistment contracts has noted, “[a]n awareness of the rights and 
liabilities an enlistee or volunteer incurs at the time of his signing of the 
enlistment agreement is absolutely necessary.”115 
Efforts to clarify the enlistment contract could also benefit from 
experience in obtaining valid waivers of constitutional rights in plea bargains 
and commercial contracts. When reviewing the validity of waivers of 
constitutional rights in plea bargains, courts focus on language that explicitly 
identifies the right being waived and obtains the criminal defendant’s explicit 
agreement to waive the right.116 Similarly, courts reviewing the 
enforceability of contracts waiving jury-trial rights have required that the 
contract language explicitly identifies and waives the right.117 Although it 
                                                 
111 Compare DD Form 4/1, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, supra note 69, at  
¶ 10, with id. at ¶ 9. 
112 See Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
extension of member’s enlistment contract under statute authorizing “stop-loss” policy in time 
of war); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same). 
113 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946. 
114 See Dilloff, supra note 39, at 149 (“In order for the enlistment to be 
legitimately termed a ‘contract,’ these prerequisites must be met, and the unfortunate 
characterization of enlistment as being a change in status will be banished forever in the 
catacombs of sovereign supremacy.”); see also Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 
F.3d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Incorporation by reference is proper where the underlying 
contract makes clear reference to a separate document, the identity of the separate document 
may be ascertained, and incorporation of the document will not result in surprise or 
hardship.”). 
115 Dilloff, supra note 39, at 149. 
116 Supra, notes 91–95, and accompanying text. 
117 Supra, notes 96–99, and accompanying text. 
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may be impossible to comprehensively identify and discuss every right that 
is waived or modified by enlistment, the conduct section could explicitly 
identify UCMJ and MCM provisions that restrict free-speech, free-
association, free-exercise, and jury-trial rights.118 In combination with 
procedures that make the UCMJ and MCM available to enlistees for their 
review, these provisions could substantially improve enlistees’ awareness of 
the consequences of entering into an enlistment contract. 
Finally, enlistment contracts could benefit from experience in 
another area of status-changing contracts: marriage. State laws governing the 
validity of premarital agreements often require that, in order for the 
agreements to be presumptively valid, the parties must have opportunity to 
seek legal counsel.119 Since premarital agreements usually govern only the 
distribution of property upon dissolution of the marriage and military 
enlistment affects a much wider range of rights, the potential need for legal 
advice before enlisting in the military would seem much greater. It would not 
be onerous to require the government to include a phrase in the enlistment 
contract encouraging prospective enlistees to seek independent legal advice 
to resolve any questions they might have about the meaning of the contract’s 
terms and allowing (as with some types of commercial contracts) a brief 
period within which an enlistee may cancel the contract.120 These modest 
measures would mirror the protections applied in civilian employment 
contracts and help ensure that military enlistees were actually informed of 
the consequences of the enlistment contract. 121 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Since the post-Civil War era, courts have used the language of 
contract when addressing challenges to enlistment agreements. But the courts 
use of the language of contract has not been accompanied by the application 
of important contract principles, particularly including contra proferentem 
and the requirement that constitutional rights can only be contractually 
waived if the rights are made knowingly and voluntarily. The failure to apply 
these principles in the era of the all-volunteer military risks reversion to a 
                                                 
118 See supra notes 86–88. 
119 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1 (2014); see also Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 
365 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding premarital agreement unenforceable 
where wife had no opportunity to consult with attorney). 
120 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 326B.811, subd. 1 (2014) (allowing customer in roofing 
contract to cancel within 72 hours). 
121 See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 
2005) (applying a rule requiring that challenge to employment-agreement waiver of jury-trial 
rights include assessment of factors including “plaintiff’s experience, background, and 
education,” “the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver,” “an 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer,” and “the clarity of the waiver”); see also Katherin J. 
Chapman, Note, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal Accountability 
Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1074 (2010) (arguing for the insertion of clauses 
specifically imposing liability under the UCMJ into contracts for private military contractors). 
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time where the state, empowered to compel military service from its citizens, 
arbitrarily varies the terms of their service at its whim. This article proposes 
modest modifications to the enlistment contract that would flesh out the 
contractual cast of military enlistment and ensure, rather than assume, that 
prospective enlistees knowingly and voluntarily assent to the strictures of 
military service. It may be hilarious for Tim Allen to unwittingly stumble 
into a Santa suit, but it is much less so if the suit is combat camouflage. 
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